SERVICE PROVIDER
LIABILITY
Obscenity: Discussion
● Generally
The state of the law regarding Service Provider liability for obscenity
is particularly unsettled at this time. The
Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA) could dramatically alter the potential liability that Service Providers face for the
conduct of their users and subscribers. The ACLU filed a suit challenging the
CDA, which
has been argued before the U.S. Supreme Court and a decision is pending.
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Click on this graphic to go to the ACLU Web site for more
information on this case. Also, the ACLU will post an announcement and the text of the
Supreme Court's Decision when it becomes available (probably in July, 1997).
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The case law for Service Provider liability for the conduct of users is scant at best.
A recent case in which the Service Provider was held liable does not adequately represent
the liability that a service provider might actually face because, in this case, it was
the Service Provider that was responsible for uploading the offending content. Clearly, if
a cause of action arises out of a Service Provider's conduct, the facts are not square on
all four corners with liability based on a theory of vicarious liability.
● Case analysis
In
United States v.
Thomas, the defendants were the operators of the Amateur Action Bulletin Board
System (AABBS). The purpose of the AABBS was to provide subscribers with access to
sexually explicit material. The defendants uploaded sexually explicit pictures onto the
system, which could then be downloaded and viewed by subscribers for a fee. The system
also accepted orders for sexually explicit video tapes that were shipped by common
carrier. The defendants were then not merely a Service Provider but also the principle
actors whose conduct gave rise to the cause of action. Thus, on its face, this case does
not represent a illustrative set of facts on which to base an analysis of vicarious
liability for Service Providers where the original cause of action arises out of the
conduct of someone other than the Service Provider. However, a brief discussion of some of
the salient aspects of the case may serve to illuminate some potential areas of concern to
Service Providers.
The defendants in
Thomas
argued that the local community standards for obscenity (see
Miller v. California) of Memphis,
Tennessee should not be applied because they were from and their BBS was located in
California. Miller stands for the
proposition that juries are to apply the standards of the community into which the
materials are sent. The defendants argued that a new definition of community should be
adopted due to the nature of BBS systems, in that a BBS is capable of transmitting
material virtually all over the world. The court rejected this argument on the basis that
the defendants knew where the materials were going and had control over whether the
materials were to be available because they had approved an application for membership
that was submitted from Tennessee, just as they approved each application for membership.
Thomas (see also,
Obscenity in Cyberspace). Some
might argue that this case represents setting a national, if not international, community
standard of indecency (the standard of Memphis, Tennessee
E-Law
3.0.1, or of the most restrictive locale that a BBS or the Internet could reach or has
reached). Although, this argument may ultimately prevail, it does not take into account
that the community standards of Memphis was allowed in
Thomas precisely because the
defendants did know that their material was being accessed from and shipped to
Memphis.
Thomas also argued that
§1465
does not apply to computer generated files transmitted in binary code.
Thomas. The court reasoned that
" . . . focusing solely on the manner and form in which the computer generated images
were transmitted . . . " is erroneous.
Thomas,
(quoting U.S. v. Gilboe).
"[e]lectronic signals in this context are the means by which funds are transported.
The beginning of the transaction is money in one account and the ending is money in
another. The manner in which the funds were moved does not affect the ability to obtain
tangible paper dollars or a bank check from the receiving account."
Thomas, (quoting
Gilboe). The Thomas court applied
the Gilboe rationale and held that focusing on the means of transmission did not take them
out of the scope of §1465. See also,
Obscenity in Cyberspace.
Furthermore, the court held that
§1465
applied to their facts notwithstanding the fact that it does not expressly cover computer
transmissions. The court pointed out that "the rule of ejusdem generis
should not be 'employed to render general words meaningless' or 'be used to defeat the
obvious purpose of the legislation.'"
Thomas,
(quoting U.S. v. Alpers). The
court further said that construing statutes should be done " . . . so as to give
effect to the intent of Congress" and that the intent of Congress was clearly to
prevent the interstate transportation of obscene material.
Thomas.
Finally, Thomas relied on
Stanley
v. Georgia in arguing that the First Amendment right to freedom of speech protects
their possession of the GIF files (digital files that contain or store the data which
becomes an image when displayed on a computer screen) in their home.
Thomas. Here, the court presents a
clarification of Stanley as contained
in
U.S. v. 12
200-Ft. Reels of Super 8mm. Film. The Supreme Court explained in
Reels of Super 8mm.
Film that the holding in
Stanley
was based upon a right to privacy in the home and not on a First Amendment right to
freedom of speech. Thomas. The
Supreme Court has also held that the right to possess obscene materials does not create a
right to receive, transport, or distribute it and that the zone of protection created by
the right to privacy is around the home and not around the protected materials when they
are moved from the home.
Thomas,
(citing, U.S. v. Orito). Thus, because
"[the Thomases] went beyond merely possessing obscene GIF files in their home (i.e.,
they sold and distributed the materials)," they had exceeded the bounds of the
protection created by the right to privacy in the home.
Thomas.
● Communications
Decency Act
The Communications Decency Act of
1996 was passed on February 1, 1996. By February 7, 1996, the
ACLU had filed a challenge to it on Constitutional grounds in
the federal courts. A three judge panel determined that the challenged provisions were
unconstitutional during the summer of 1996. The Department of Justice appealed the
decision to the U.S. Supreme Court and oral arguments were heard on March 19, 1997. A
decision is expected in July of 1997.
>
The CDA
The CDA would criminalize the providers of certain material on the Internet if the
material can be displayed in a manner available to a person under the age of 18.
CDA. The material in question includes
depictions, descriptions, and communications of a sexual nature. The language of the act
resorts to the standards of "patently offensive as measured by contemporary community
standards" and "indecent" in determining what material would be prohibited
or criminalized. §§ 223(a)(1)(B)(ii)
& (d)(1)(B). The use of the words "offensive" and "indecent"
are broad terms and would have the effect of proscribing much valuable content on the
Internet. In the minds of commentators, scholars, and analysts, this would have the effect
of reducing or "dumbing down" the content available on the Internet to that
which is appropriate for school children.
Amicus
Brief. Thus, even adults would not be able to access content of a nature that they can
already access in print, at movies, or from cable television services.
Furthermore, the CDA would establish severe criminal penalties for Service Providers
that knowingly permit their facilities to be used for any activity prohibited by certain
provisions of the CDA.
§223(d)(2).
The CDA does provide defenses for Service Providers if they either (1) provide nothing but
an unimproved Internet connection (§223(e)(1))
or (2) restrict access by minors to the Web sites containing material that could be
construed as prohibited by the CDA.
§223(e)(5).
In the case of the first defense available to Service Providers, the defense could be lost
if their Web sites contain search engines or links that enable a minor to find content
that comes within the broad purview of the CDA.
Content Restrictions. In the case of
the second defense available to Service Providers, the defense is available if they make a
good faith attempt to censor the content available from their Internet server.
Content Restrictions. The Service
Providers attempts to restrict access to these materials would have the effect of making
them the guardians of what is acceptable content and might also allow them to violate the
privacy of what would otherwise be legally protected communications.
Content Restrictions. The incentives
provided by either of the two defenses would result in an Internet that is more difficult
to use and navigate (because of the difficulty of accessing search tools and links) and/or
an Internet that does not contain material which adults could obtain through a variety of
other media (because of Service Providers' attempts to restrict content to the lowest
common denominator of community standards), much of which has significant SLAP value
(Scientific, Literary, Artistic, Political, including educational, journalistic, and
medical, inter alia). Amicus Brief and
Content Restrictions.
Ultimately, we do not know what the status of Service Provider liability for obscenity
will be. It is sufficient to say, however, that a Service Provider could be exposed to
some liability under the current scheme (or lack thereof) if a subscriber were to violate
18 U.S.C. 1465 and the Service Provider either knew or should have known of
the activity. We have not found an incident of this happening so far. It may be that
interested parties are awaiting the outcome of the CDA decision before proceeding with
legal action. And finally, if the Supreme Court does strike down the CDA, it will only be
a matter of time before more carefully drawn legislation makes its way through Congress.
Service Provider Liability Pages
Introduction •
Table of Contents
Servcie Providers - Overview • Service Providers - Discussion • Liability Analogies - Overview • Liability Analogies - Discussion • Defamation - Overview • Defamation - Discussion • Intellectual Property - Overview • Intellectual Property - Discussion • Obscenity - Overview • Obscenity - Discussion • Criminal - Overview • Criminal Discussion • Privacy - Overview • Privacy - Discussion • Policy Discussion • Conclusion • Pocket Part • Notes & Links
Prepared for
Professor Laura
Gasaway's Cyberspace Law Seminar (Law
- 357C)
UNC School of Law - Spring 1997
By: Ashe Lockhart
(Webmaster) & Carol Kozar
Instructor:
Laura N. Gasaway,
Professor of Law and Director of the Katherine
R. Everett Law Library
Copyright © 1997 Ashe
Lockhart & Carol Kozar